Covert Voice over Internet Protocol communications based on spatial model by Huang, Yongfeng & Tang, Shanyu
    
Covert Voice over Internet Protocol Communications Based on 
Spatial Model 
HUANG Yongfeng1,2, TANG Shanyu3,4* 
1 Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China 
2 Tsinghua National Laboratory for Information Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China 
3 School of Computer Science, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, China 
4 Department of Computing, London Metropolitan University, London N7 8DB, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
This paper presents a new spatial steganography model for covert communications over Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP), providing a solution to the issue of increasing the capacity of 
covert VoIP channels without compromising the imperceptibility of the channels. Drawing 
from Orthogonal Modulation Theory in communications, the model introduced two concepts, 
orthogonal data hiding features and data hiding vectors, to covert VoIP communications. By 
taking into account the variation characteristics of VoIP audio streams in the time domain, a 
hiding vector negotiation mechanism was suggested to achieve dynamic self-adaptive ste-
ganography in media streams. Experimental results on VoIP steganography show that the pro-
posed steganographic method effectively depicted the spatial and temporal characteristics of 
VoIP audio streams, and enhanced robustness against detection of steganalysis tools, thereby 
improving the security of covert VoIP communications.  
covert communication, multimedia networking, VoIP, data security 
 
 
                           
*Corresponding author (email: shanyu.tang@gmail.com) 
 
  
1  Introduction 
Covert communication is the science of hiding the existence of secret information in innocent cover ob-
jects. In this paper, covert communications mean that secret messages are transmitted between the 
communicating parties by using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) steganography rather than cryptog-
raphy. 
Streaming media have emerged as a new means of communications over the Internet, and the pace of 
fresh developments is accelerating. It is anticipated that streaming media will dominate the long-distance 
communications in the next few years. The applications of streaming media technologies include Video 
on Demand (VOD), Audio on Demand (AOD), Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), and VoIP, etc. 
With the upsurge of streaming media applications available for commercial use in recent years, 
streaming media become one of the most interesting cover objects for information hiding. Unlike static 
cover objects, such as text, images, and audio files, streaming media as cover objects have the following 
characteristics: 
a) Spatial characteristics of media streams. Media streams are dynamic chunks of a series of packets 
that consist of IP headers, UDP headers, RTP headers, and payloads i.e. audio and/or video frames. 
These headers and frames have a number of unused fields, providing plausible covert channels and thus 
giving scope for steganography. Each header or frame could be treated as a dimension, and so it is worth 
exploring data hiding in headers and frames in view of spatial dimensions. 
b) Temporal characteristics of media streams. The temporal behavior of media streams manifests in 
two aspects. First, the payloads of media streams show a significant temporal characteristic. For example, 
audio frames can be sorted into two groups, active voice and inactive voice; I, B and P frames appear 
alternately in video streams. Second, the packet loss rate of media streams is related to time in the course 
of media streams transmission. Thus, steganographic algorithms for embedding data in media streams 
 
 should be ‘self-adaptive’ in the temporal dimension. 
c) Real-time media streams. Streaming media communications originate from the sender, and the re-
ceiver normally plays the arrived media streams without storing them. Steganography in media streams 
is a dynamic process, which should not interrupt the real time distribution of media streams. It requires 
both data embedding and data extraction to be conducted in a real time manner. Such real time data em-
bedding and extraction differentiates steganography in media streams from steganography in static cover 
objects such as text, image and audio files. 
Covert communications over streaming media are resulted from the integration of information hiding 
and network media stream technologies, and have become the main focus of attention in the field of in-
formation security. There has been some effort to study covert communications over streaming media; 
however, most existing studies focus mainly on the steganographic algorithms based on a single charac-
teristic of streaming media. Such approaches have bottlenecked efforts to improve data hiding capacity. 
In this study, we seek ways to improve data hiding capacity by taking into account multiple characteris-
tics in the spatial and temporal dimensions of streaming media. 
The motivation of this paper is to achieve dynamic self-adaptive covert communications over VoIP by 
introducing two concepts, orthogonal hiding features and hiding vectors, to covert communications over 
VoIP, with their orthogonal hiding features being abstracted as a multi-dimensional hiding space model 
according to the spatial structure of IP packets of media streams, and use of hiding vectors in the model 
to greatly improves the secret data conveying rate of covert VoIP communications. 
2  Related work 
Contrary to image and audio steganography, covert communications over streaming media are largely 
unexplored so far. There have been some attempts to develop network protocols- and/or VoIP-based ste-
ganographic algorithms. For example, in [1] [2] [3] researchers studied ways to hide data by means of 
 
  
TCP/IP protocols, suggesting headers substitution-based algorithms for hiding data in unused header 
fields. 
Bai et al. [4] suggested a covert channel over the jitter fields of RTCP headers, where a piece of secret 
information is modulated into the jitter fields according to the statistical parameters computed. Depend-
ing on whether the secret information bit number is ‘0’ or ‘1’, the time intervals between packets are 
modulated. The advantage of this method lies in high steganographic transparency, but data hiding ca-
pacity is relatively low and performance is less robust. 
In light of audio/video frames, Huang et al. [5] investigated steganography in VoIP streams encoded 
by G.711 codec, proposing a LSB matching-based steganographic algorithm with the help of the redun-
dant audio data mechanism to avoid loss of hidden information. Their method sustains better conceal-
ment level than traditional LSB algorithms. 
Aoki [6] worked out a technique of lossless steganography in G.711μ encoded speech. The method 
adopts audio streams encoded by pulse-code modulation (PCM) as cover objects, in which plenty of 
least significant bits exist. When using μ-law G.711 in networks, the codec takes a 14-bit signed linear 
audio sample as an input, increases the magnitude by 32 (binary 100000), and converts it to an 8 bit val-
ue; the sign bit ‘0’ is expressed as ‘-0’ and ‘+0’. With this method, the audio sample ‘0’ is altered to ‘-0’ 
or ‘+0’ when embedding secret data ‘0’ or ‘1’, respectively. So data hiding capacity is dependent on the 
number of ‘0’s in the audio sample, and the applications are limited. 
Hiding data in low bit rate VoIP streams is more challenging, as there is less redundancy in the audio 
streams. By analyzing noisy resistance, Su et al. [7] suggested a codebook-based steganographic algo-
rithm for hiding secret data in VoIP streams coded by G.729A codec. Liu et al. [8] identified the G.729 
speech parameters that are suitable for data hiding through analyzing the parameter characteristics of 
G.729 encoded audio frames. 
Xiao et al. [9] pioneered a method for hiding data in low bit rate VoIP streams, which is the first ever 
 
 effort to improve the codebook partition by using Graph theory along with Quantization Index Modula-
tion. With this approach, random codebook partitions are prevented and speech quality is then guaran-
teed. 
Mazurczyk et al. [10][11], Druid [12] and Kratzer et al. [13] developed various methods of hiding da-
ta in VoIP streams, suggesting synchronization mechanisms between the sending party and the receiving 
party. 
Analysis of the studies above shows the previously proposed steganographic algorithms are based 
solely on a single hiding feature. Although these algorithms can achieve different levels of data hiding, 
the corresponding data hiding capacities are not large enough to have practical applications in covert 
communications systems. To improve usability of the systems, it is necessary to seek a new way to fur-
ther increase the data hiding capacity. Hence, in this study we suggest a new method capable of hiding 
large amounts of data in multiple dimensions of media streams so as to greatly improve the data hiding 
capacity. 
To take up the challenges, this study is to build a multi-dimensional data hiding spatial theoretical 
model for steganography in media streams through analyzing the fundamental characteristics of media 
streams. The new model is then applied to covert communications over VoIP, which is widely used on 
the Internet. The experimental results show that the model effectively depicts the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of media streams, providing a good solution to data hiding capacity and security issues in 
covert VoIP communications. 
3  Proposed covert VoIP communication model 
3.1 Structure of media streams  
Media streams-based communications work on the same network principles (and often on the same 
network) as conventional data traffic. The session initiation protocol (SIP) is used to initiate and control 
 
  
sections between the communicating parties; when the content of the request begins to flow, it is carried 
over the real-time transport protocol (RTP). As shown in Fig. 1, audio and video media streams are dy-
namic chunks of a series of packets that consist of IP headers, UDP headers, RTP headers, and numbers 
of audio and/or video frames, which can be regarded as a four-layer/dimension structure. 
 
Media frame … Media frameUDP headerIP header RTP header
Media packet 1 Media packet 2 Media packet n…
 
Figure 1  Structure of media streams. 
Media streams are essentially a sequence of IP packets, which are the basic units consisting of proto-
col headers and payloads (frames) with unused fields. As cover objects, media streams can then be char-
acterized from the perspective of temporal and spatial dimensions. The proposed spatial model detailed 
below describes the macro hiding features of media streams and their dynamic hiding behavior in the 
temporal domain, with particular focus on designing a self-adaptive hiding algorithm and a mechanism 
of hiding synchronization. The micro hiding features of individual IP packets are studied in view of mul-
ti-dimensional hiding space, so as to seek ways to largely improve data hiding capacity. 
3.2 Spatial model for steganography in streaming media 
Previous studies have established several algorithms for hiding data in different IP headers [3]. For in-
stance, there are IP protocol- or RTP protocol-based steganographic algorithms, as well as algorithms for 
hiding data in media frames, which have laid the foundation for this work. On the basis of the research 
results, we develop a new spatial model for steganography in media streams. The definitions below in-
troduce the proposed model. 
According to the spatial structure of IP packets of media streams, their orthogonal hiding features are 
 
 abstracted as a multi-dimensional hiding space model; use of hiding vectors in the model greatly im-
proves the secret data conveying rate of covert communications over media streams. By taking into ac-
count the variation characteristics of media streams in the time domain, a hiding vector negotiation 
mechanism is proposed in this study to achieve dynamic self-adaptive covert VoIP communications. 
Suppose a media stream is denoted by P(k), 
1
( ) ( )
k
P k p kT
∞
=
=∑ , where p(kT) represents the IP packets 
that comprise the media stream P(k), and T is the time length of the media packet. 
Definition 1: Hiding feature. It is the feature of a media packet which is suited to data hiding, denoted 
by e. In general, a cover object has different features suitable for data hiding. From a hiding feature, ones 
can design a variety of steganographic algorithms. For example, RTP timestamp is a hiding feature of a 
media packet, on which different steganographic algorithms can be established [4][10]. 
Definition 2: Hiding feature set. It is a set of all the hiding features of a media packet, through which 
data hiding is achievable, denoted by Rm, { }mm eeR ,...,1= , where ie  is the ith hiding feature. For in-
stance, in a media packet, codebook field of G.723.1 codec and RTP timestamp field have different hid-
ing features, which comprise the hiding feature set of the media packet. 
Definition 3: Orthogonality of two hiding features. If two hiding features ( ie and je ) of the media 
packet p(kT) are used for data hiding through two corresponding steganographic algorithms, )( ii ef  and 
)( jj ef , the two algorithms operate independently, and their results do not affect each other, the features 
( ie and je ) are then considered to be orthogonal (statistically unrelated), denoted by ie ⊥ je . The cor-
responding algorithms, )( ii ef  and )( jj ef , are orthogonal too, i.e. 0)(),( =jjii efef . 
Definition 4: Orthogonal hiding feature set. It is a group of pairs of orthogonal hiding features of a 
media packet, denoted by { }{ | , , }, 1,...,n k N i jR e i j N e e N n⊥ ∈= ∀ ∈ ⊥ = , and ,n mR R n m⊥ ⊆ ∀ ≤ . 
Definition 5: n-dimensional hiding space of a packet based on n-element orthogonal hiding feature set. 
 
  
If the orthogonal hiding feature set of a media packet has n elements, the packet contains n dimensions 
for data hiding, denoted by ( ( )) { | 1,... }n ip kT e i nφ = = . Among them, the ith dimensional hiding feature ei 
constitutes the ith dimensional axis in n-dimensional data hiding space.  
Definition 6: Metafunction of hiding feature. In n-dimensional data hiding space of a media packet, if 
mi steganographic functions are obtained through the ith dimensional hiding feature, those functions are 
regarded as metafunctions, which can be described as ( ), , 1,..., ; 1,...,ii k i i if e i n k m∀ = = . They satisfy 
( ) ( )( ), , , 1,..., ; 1,...,i ii k i i k i if e f p kT i n k m= ∀ = = . In particular, no hiding is denoted as the null metafunction 
( ),0 , 1,...,i if e i n∀ = .       
Theorem 1: Judgment rule for steganographic function orthogonality. 
If the media packet p(kT) has n-dimensional hiding space, the ith dimensional steganographic meta-
function ( ) iiiki mknief i ,...,1;,...,1,, ==∀  in the space is reciprocally orthogonal to the jth dimensional ste-
ganographic metafunction ( ), , 1,..., ; 1,...,jj k j j jf e j n k m∀ = =  in terms of the data hiding operation on the 
packet, i.e. ( )( ) ( )( ) jjiikjki mkmknjikTpfkTpf ji ,...,1,,...,1},,...,1{,,0, ,, ==∈∀= . 
The reciprocally orthogonal character of steganographic metafunctions mentioned above means that 
there are no logical relevance to each other between the steganographic metafunctions in the ith and jth 
dimensions, i.e., these steganographic metafunctions corresponding to different data hiding features (al-
gorithms) are not, of course, related reciprocally, leading to any decrease in the total hiding capacity 
when they are used together in covert communications. 
Definition 7: Hiding vector function. The hiding vector function ( )( )kTpFK3  is an ordered collection 
of different dimensional hiding metafunctions, which are used for data hiding simultaneously, in 
n-dimensional space of the media packet p(kT). It is given by 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) { } { }11, , 1, 1, , 1, ,nk n k nF p kT f f p kT m m= ∀ ∈ × ×k k     
Definition 8: Data hiding capacity of hiding vector. It is defined as the sum of numbers of bits of se-
 
 cret information hidden in a media packet by using the hiding vector 33 ,...,1)),((3 mkkTpFK =∀ , in bits per 
second (bps). The data hiding capacity of the hiding vector can be expressed as ( )( )F p kT . 
Theorem 2: Data hiding capacity theorem. 
If a media packet has an n-dimensional hiding vector function, the data hiding capacity of the vector 
function is equal to the sum of the data hiding capacities of n metafunctions that constitute the hiding 
vector, i.e. ( )( ) ( ) { } { } ( ), 1
1
, 1, , 1, ,
i
n
i k i n n
i
F p kT f e m m M R⊥
=
= ∀ ∈ × × =∑k k    . 
Definition 9: Imperceptibility of hiding vector. The imperceptibility of a hiding vector is a measure of 
the degree of difficulty in distinguishing the difference between the untapped and stego media streams, 
and it is dependent upon the worst imperceptibility among all the metafunctions that constitute the hid-
ing vector, i.e. the Buckets effect of the hiding vector. The imperceptibility of the hiding vector 
( )( ) ( ), nF p kT M R⊥∈k k  can be expressed as ( )( ) { } ( ),min | 1,..., ,ii k nF p kT f i n M R⊥= = ∈k k
uuv uuuv
. 
Theorem 3: Imperceptibility theorem. 
In n-dimensional hiding space of a media packet, the phase of the hiding vector ( )( )F p kTk
uuv
 repre-
sents its imperceptibility. If there are two different hiding vectors with the same data hiding capacity in 
the n-dimensional hiding space, the one whose phase direction is close to the space diagonal (i.e. the 
difference in imperceptibility between each pair of dimensions is minimal) will have better impercepti-
bility. 
Definition 10: Hiding capacity set F. In media streams-based covert communications systems, differ-
ent hiding metafunctions in n-dimensional hiding space of a media packet can constitute various hiding 
vectors 
3 3
, 1,...,KF K M= . The hiding vector set provides the hiding capacity set for covert communica-
tion terminals, i.e. { }3 3| 1,...,KF F K M= = . In the hiding capacity set, each hiding vector is marked by 
a unique k3, which is called hiding vector number. 
 
  
3.3 Spatial model-based covert communications over media streams 
Cachin [14] suggested an information-theoretic model applicable to image and audio steganography, but 
the model is not suitable for covert communications over media streams because of heavy packet loss 
during the transmission of media streams. To bridge the gap, we propose the following model based on 
the spatial model detailed in the previous section. 
In the Internet environment, UDP protocol is generally used to transfer streaming media such as VoIP, 
etc., thus, packet loss is inevitable. And at different periods, because of the different numbers of users on 
the Internet, there is a great difference in the size of network traffic. Therefore, the packet loss rate varies 
with time in VoIP communications over the Internet. In our experimental environment, the average 
packet loss rate was 17% for one week between 1 September 2015 and 6 September 2015; the average 
annual packet loss rate was about 13% between 1 September 2014 and 1 September 2015, indicating 
high variable packet loss rates for VoIP communications. 
If VoIP packets are used as the carriers to realize covert communication, it needs to solve the problem 
of the recovery and reliability of the hidden information in the streaming packets in the case of packet 
loss. In the proposed algorithm, a spatial model for data hiding is used to achieve a high hiding capacity 
for covert communications over VoIP. The proposed algorithm solves the packet loss problem by using 
the fast starting retransmission algorithm, i.e. re-transmitting the packet once three irregular orders of 
ACK occur without waiting until the expiry of the timer RTO, so as to achieve a reasonable conveying 
rate of the hidden message (See Section 4.1 and Fig. 4). 
Assuming the communicating parties have established the same hiding capacity set in their terminals 
{ }3 3 1| 1,..., nk iiF F k m== = ∏ , the key methodology ‘temporal and spatial hiding synchronization’, is intro-
duced to covert VoIP communications. 
In the media streams 
1
( ) ( )
N
k
P k p kT
=
=∑ , part of media packets is used to hide the secret data 
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where Bi is part of the bits of the secret data, P*(k) is the stego media streams consisting of media pack-
ets without any hidden data, p(kT), and those with hidden data, p*(kT). The stego media packets p*(kT) 
are those packets, selected from the media packets p(kT), in which the secret data are embedded by using 
some hiding vector functions ( )
3k
F  in the hiding capacity set F.  
The media streams with hidden data P*(k), originating from the sender, are transmitted over the In-
ternet and distributed to the receiver. As equation (1) shows, the receiver requires solving the following 
two main problems before the secret data M can be extracted from the received stego media streams 
P*(k). 
(a) Identifying media packets with hidden data from those without hidden data in P*(k), and  
(b) Judging which hiding vectors are used by the stego packets p*(kT) to embed the secret data. 
The above problems are regarded as the ‘temporal synchronization’ and ‘spatial synchronization’ is-
sues of covert communications. 
Supposing a hiding vector F0() is added to the hiding capacity set of the communicating parties 
{ }3 3 1| 1,..., nk iiF F k m== = ∏  to form { }3 3 1| 0,..., nk iiF F k m== = ∏ , where F0() is a void function representing 
no data hiding operation, equation (1) becomes 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
3
* *
3
1 1 1
, , 1,..., ,
nN N
k i i i i
k k i
P k F p kT B p kT k m B M B
= = =
= = ∀ = ∈ ∨ =∅∑ ∑ ∏      (2) 
Equation (2) shows the temporal and spatial hiding synchronization in covert communications over 
 
  
media streams requires the communicating parties to set up an updating mechanism for consulting and 
sharing the information on the hiding vectors having been used by individual media packets for data 
hiding. 
In other words, the temporal and spatial hiding synchronization means a negotiation mechanism al-
lows the communicating parties to share the information about the currently used hiding vector number 
thorough a covert channel. For a media packet using the hiding vector F0(), there is no hidden infor-
mation; otherwise, the media packet contains secret data. If the receiving party has known the hiding 
vector ( )
3k
F  used by the current media packet, the receiver can then extract the secret data from the 
media packets. The data extracting process is described as 
( )( ) ( )( )
3 3
1 * 1 *
3
1 1 1
ˆ , 1,...,
nN N
k i k i
k k i
B F P k B F p kT k m− −
= = =
= = = ∀ =∑ ∑ ∏   (3) 
where ( )
3
1
kF
−  is the reverse engineering of the hiding vector, i.e. the process of extracting secret data. 
( )( )
3
1 *
kF p kT
−  refers to the process of extracting secret data from the media packets with hidden data. 
To sum up, according to the multi-dimensional data hiding spatial model for steganography in media 
streams, the temporal and spatial hiding synchronization in covert VoIP communications is essentially a 
process of negotiating the hiding vectors of individual media packets. 
4  Results and discussion 
In this section, we detail an application of the proposed multi-dimensional data hiding spatial model to 
improving covert VoIP communications software called StegTalk. It enables the software to adopt a dy-
namic self-adaptive method of selecting hiding vectors, and a mechanism for negotiating hiding vectors 
via a covert channel. 
 
 
 4.1 Application of Spatial model to covert VoIP communications 
In the experiments, VoIP streams were chosen as cover objects to conduct steganography experiments so 
as to verify the proposed multi-dimensional data hiding spatial model. 
VoIP is currently the most typical media stream application on the Internet, and relevant technologies 
have been developed rapidly over the past 10 years. According to the data from IDC, VoIP usage in 2000 
amounted to 15% of the long-distance communications, but it reached 70% in 2009. So the significance 
of exploring steganography in VoIP streams becomes clear in media streams-based covert communica-
tions. 
On the basis of our previous studies [4] [5] [7] [9] [15] and others [16] [17] on VoIP steganographic 
algorithms, we first established a multi-dimensional data hiding spatial model and a hiding capacity set 
for covert VoIP communications, and then developed VoIP-based covert communications software with 
high data hiding capacity, high imperceptibility and high security. Taking this as an experimental plat-
form, we consequently summarized the advantages of the proposed multi-dimensional data hiding spa-
tial model through practical test and theoretical analysis. 
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Figure 2  Implementation of covert VoIP communications using StegTalk. 
 
The related work described in Section 2 shows that there are several algorithms for embedding data in 
VoIP streams and we have suggested some algorithms for steganography in VoIP [4][5][7][9][15][18]. 
Based on our previous research and the proposed multi-dimensional data hiding spatial model, we de-
veloped software called StegTalk for covert VoIP communications (Fig. 2). 
For the VoIP media streams 
1
( ) ( )
N
k
P k p kT
=
=∑ , the hiding feature set (R) of the packet p(kT) is given by 
 
, .723.1 .729 .723.1 , .723.1 si .729{ , , , , }RTP PCM LSB G LSB G A LSB G QIM G l G A silR e e e e e e e− − − − − −=             (4) 
where RTPe is the hiding feature using RTP header fields as cover objects [4], PCM LSBe −  is the hiding 
feature using the lowest bit position in PCM code as cover objects [5][6][11][19][20], .723.1G LSBe −  is the 
hiding feature using G.723.1 compression parameters as cover objects [7], .729G A LSBe −  is the hiding fea-
ture using G.729A compression parameters as cover objects [7], .723.1G QIMe −  is the hiding feature using 
G.723.1 codebooks as cover objects [9], .723.1 siG le −  is the hiding feature using G.723.1 inactive voice 
frames as cover objects, and .729G A sile −  is the hiding feature using G.729A inactive voice frames as cover 
objects [18]. 
From the hiding feature set R of VoIP packets, ones can build various orthogonal hiding feature sets, 
1R
⊥  to 5R
⊥ , through analysis of the hiding process of the algorithms in the set R, given by 
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Figure 3  Scheme for 
⊥
3R  3-dimensional orthogonal hiding space. 
 
The different orthogonal hiding feature sets above can then be used to constitute different mul-
ti-dimensional orthogonal hiding space. For example, 1R
⊥  is 2-dimensional hiding space, ⊥2R  to ⊥5R  
are 3-dimensional orthogonal hiding space. Given that G.723.1 codec is the most commonly used audio 
encoding protocol in VoIP and in view of our previous research, the following focuses mainly on the ⊥3R  
3-dimensional orthogonal hiding space, as shown in Fig. 3. 
In Fig. 3, the coordinates f1,1 and f1,2 on the axis x(eRTP) denote two different algorithms for hiding data 
in RTP header fields [4]. The former employs LSB substitution of RTP header timestamp with data hid-
ing capacity of 2 bits/packet; the latter embeds data in the PT field of RTP header with data hiding ca-
 
  
pacity of 4 bits/packet. Similarly, the coordinates f2,1, f2,2 and f2,3 on the axis y(eG.723.1-sil) refer to algo-
rithms for hiding data in G.723.1 (6.3kbps) encoded inactive voice frames at different data hiding capac-
ities of 16, 44 and 105 bits/frame [18]. The coordinates f3,1 and f3,2 represent two steganographic algo-
rithms using G.723.1 quantization codebook [9], with data hiding capacities of 3 and 6 bits/frame, re-
spectively. These algorithms in ⊥3R  have been proved to be able to withstand steganalysis presented in 
[21][22]. 
Table 1  Some commonly used hiding vectors 
Vector 
no 
Hiding 
vector 
Hiding met-
afunction 
Hiding capac-
ity 
Imperceptibil-
ity 
00 F0 Reserved Reserved Reserved 
01 F1 f1,1, f2,1, 
f3,1 
2+16*m+3*
n 
f21 
02 F2 f1,2, f2,1, 
f3,1 
9+16*m+3*
n 
f21 
03 F3 f1,1, f2,2, 
f3,1 
2+44*m+3*
n 
f22 
04 F4 f1,2, f2,2, 
f3,1 
9+44*m+3*
n 
f22 
05 F5 f1,1, f2,3, 
f3,1 
2+105*m+3
*n 
f23 
06 F6 f1,2, f2,3, 
f3,1 
9+105*m+3
*n 
f23 
07 F7 f1,1, f2,1, 2+16*m+6* f21 
 
 f3,2 n 
08 F8 f1,2, f2,1, 
f3,2 
7+16*m+6*
n 
f21 
09 F9 f1,1, f2,2, 
f3,2 
2+44*m+6*
n 
f22 
10 F10 f1,2, f2,2, 
f3,2 
7+44*m+6*
n 
f22 
11 F11 f1,1, f2,3, 
f3,2 
2+105*m+6
*n 
f23 
12 F12 f1,2, f2,3, 
f3,2 
7+105*m+6
*n 
f23 
13 F13 f1,1, f2,1 2+16*m f21 
14 F14 f2,1, f3,1 16*m+3*n f21 
15 F15 f1,1, f3,1 2+3*n f31 
 
According to the theorem for hiding algorithm orthogonality, the coordinates on the three axes are re-
ciprocally orthogonal. So they can be used to constitute different hiding vectors, as listed in Table 1. The 
value for n is the number of audio frames in a RTP packet, m is the number of inactive voice frames, and 
m <= n. In the light of the definition of imperceptibility of hiding vectors, the imperceptibility of a hid-
ing vector equals the lowest imperceptibility among its hiding metafunctions. 
In this study, secret data are segmented into various bit-strings that are hidden in different dimensions 
by using different related algorithms, respectively. Such a multi-dimensional hiding method can improve 
the imperceptibility of hidden data. 
The hiding vectors listed in Table 1 can constitute a hiding capacity set for covert VoIP communica-
 
  
tions. Considering the vector length affects synchronization efficiency, the hiding capacity set F does not 
contain the hiding vectors with lower data hiding capacity. The hiding capacity set is composed of 15 
commonly used hiding vectors, given by 
F={F0, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15}              (6) 
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Figure 4  Improved hierarchical model for hiding vectors. 
 
Based on ⊥3R  3-dimensional hiding space and the hiding capacity set F, we developed VoIP-based 
covert communications software called StegTalk by using our hierarchical model for covert VoIP com-
munications [15]. In the hierarchical model, we suggested a 3-layer covert communications framework 
to ensure the reliability and adaptability of different algorithms for steganography in VoIP in case of 
packet loss. As shown in Fig. 4, the improved hierarchical model is suggested to adapt to the hiding 
vector. The steganographic information application (SIA) layer provides three types of services for 
end-users, Remote shell, Secret file and Instant message, forwarding streams to the steganographic 
transmission management (STM) layer, enabling reliable and transparent transmission of streams in an 
 
 end-point-to-end-point manner. STM solves the packet loss problem by using the fast starting retrans-
mission algorithm, i.e. re-transmitting the packet once three irregular orders of ACK occur without 
waiting until the expiry of the timer RTO, so as to achieve a reasonable conveying rate of the secret 
message. The steganographic adaptation and embedding (SAE) layer is responsible for embedding the 
message, which is performed under the control of a key by using a hiding vector chosen from the hiding 
vector capacity set. So the hiding vectors can be chosen dynamically and adaptively for covert commu-
nications. 
StegTalk uses a dynamic mechanism for negotiating hiding vectors between the communicating par-
ties to achieve hiding synchronization. With StegTalk, a special covert channel over the RTCP header 
field is used to transmit the hiding vector number, accomplishing out-band synchronization. Details of 
the synchronization algorithm are described below. 
(a) For the VoIP media streams 
1
( ) ( )
N
k
P k p kT
=
=∑ , the VoIP packet p(kT) (k=1,…,n) is chosen as the data 
hiding unit. The hiding vector number used by each VoIP packet is transmitted by a covert channel over 
the LSR (Packet loss rate) header field of the corresponding RTCP packet. The detailed description is 
referred to our previous work [23]. 
(b) The mapping between the VoIP packet p(kT) and the RTCP packet is carried out through correlat-
ing the timestamp field values of their header fields, as shown in Fig. 4. If the timestamp field values are 
the same, the VoIP packet p(kT) and the RTCP packet are corresponding. 
(c) If the hiding vector number transmitted by the covert channel over the RTCP header field is 0, the 
corresponding VoIP packet contains no hidden information; otherwise, secret information is embedded 
in the VoIP packet, and the corresponding steganographic algorithm searches the hiding vector by the 
hiding vector number from the hiding capacity set of the terminal. 
(d) In covert VoIP communications, the appearance that the hiding vector number transmitted by the 
covert channel over a RTCP packet is not 0, indicates the beginning of covert communications; the p(kT) 
 
  
packet and subsequent packets in VoIP streams use the same hiding vector to embed data until the ap-
pearing of a different hiding vector number, as shown in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5  Mechanism for negotiating the hiding vector numbers to achieve hiding synchronization. 
 
In Fig. 5, the first RTCP packet uses the hiding vector Fi; through correlating the timestamp field of 
the header, the corresponding packet p(kiT) starts data embedding, and all the packets between p(k1T) 
and p((k1+n-1)T) use the same hiding vector Fi to embed data. From the p((ki+n)T) packet, the hiding 
vector Fj is used for data hiding until the p((ki+n+m-1)T) packet. At the beginning of the p((ki+n+m)T) 
packet, no data embedding occurs, as the corresponding RTCP sets the hiding vector F0. The process is 
called ‘hiding vector negotiation mechanism’. 
 
4.2 Performance and security analysis 
We conducted testing on covert VoIP communications, performance and security analysis, thereby sum-
marizing the advantages of the proposed multi-dimensional data hiding spatial model. 
4.2.1 Data hiding capacity 
According to the proposed data hiding spatial model, the data hiding capacity of a hiding vector is 
greater than any data hiding capacity of its vector components. The model makes the breakthrough nec-
essary to solve the contradiction problems between data hiding capacity and imperceptibility when the 
steganographic algorithm is based solely on a single hiding feature. Use of the hiding vector can im-
 
 prove the data hiding capacity of covert communications significantly, i.e. the data hiding rate, without 
compromising imperceptibility. 
 
 
Figure 6  Data hiding rates (bps) when using StegTalk for covert VoIP communications. 
 
Fig. 6 shows the real data hiding rates when different hiding vectors were used in the covert commu-
nications software StegTalk to embed data in VoIP streams. The results were obtained by assuming a 
RTP packet contains n audio frames, m of which are inactive voice frames, without considering packet 
loss. As Fig. 6 shows, the data hiding rates were much higher when the hiding vector F1 was used in 
StegTalk for covert communications, compared with an individual hiding metafunction f11, f21 or f31 be-
ing used as the steganographic algorithms, respectively. 
4.2.2 Imperceptibility of covert VoIP communications 
The imperceptibility of covert VoIP communications is a measure of evaluating the quality of the 
stego speech. We adopted the ITU P.862 recommendation to measure the subjective quality of the stego 
speech. The recommendation describes an objective method for predicting the subjective quality of nar-
row-band speech codec. It uses the perceptual evaluation speech quality (PESQ) value to assess the sub-
 
  
jective quality of the stego speech. 
The testing results with the ITU P.862 method is listed in Table 2. Four groups of audio streams (CM, 
CF, EM, and EF) were chosen as cover objects for covert VoIP communications in the experiments. Ta-
ble 2 shows comparisons in audio quality between non-covert communications and the covert commu-
nications that used the hiding vector F1 to hide secret information in four different VoIP streams. Com-
parisons in PESQ values between the covert communications using the hiding vector F1 and those using 
the vector components (f11, f12, and f13) are also available in the table. 
Table 2  Comparisons in audio quality between covert and non-covert communications 
Audio 
streams 
P.862 PESQ Value (Mean) 
No 
hiding 
f11 f21 f31 F1 
CM 3.49 3.49 3.49 3.43 3.43 
CF 3.34 3.34 3.34 3.31 3.31 
EM 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.28 3.28 
EF 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.25 3.24 
Average 3.36 3.36 3.33 3.32 3.31 
 
Analysis of the data listed in Table 2 shows, the imperceptibility (audio quality) of the covert commu-
nications using hiding vectors did not decrease, while the data hiding rate increased significantly. In ad-
dition, theoretical analysis reveals that segmenting the secret message into various sections and then 
hiding these sections in different dimensions of the hiding vector can improve the imperceptibility of the 
secret information. This explains our experimental results perfectly. 
 
 4.2.3 Security against steganalysis 
In the proposed multi-dimensional steganography in media streams, the secret message is first seg-
mented into blocks according to the data hiding capacities of the hiding vectors in corresponding packets; 
each block is further divided into bit-strings according to the data hiding capacities of the metafunctions 
that constitute the hiding vector. Each metafunction hides a segment of different size of the secret mes-
sage. For instance, the secret message M2 consisting of 10 letters of the alphabet has 80 bits as follows: 
M2=1010110101001111001010101010110011110010101101010101000110100110110011110011000
1 
Suppose the vectors F1, F2, F13 and F14 in Table 1 are used to transmit the secret message M2. Ac-
cording to formulas for calculating the hiding capacity (Table 1), M2 can be divided into four segments; 
each segment is divided into bit strings of different sizes, which are embedded into different metafunc-
tions of the hiding vector, as shown in Table 3. 
As Table 3 shows, each metafunction (associated with a hiding feature) contains only a bit string of 
the secret message. Since most of existing VoIP steganalysis methods are only effective in detecting a 
specific steganographic algorithm based on a single hiding feature, they are unlikely to detect the whole 
secret message that are embedded in multiple hiding features. The following experimental results prove 
that the proposed multi-dimensional steganography greatly improved the security of covert VoIP com-
munications. 
Table 3  Multi-dimensional embedding in metafunctions of the hiding vector 
Hidi
ng 
vec-
tor 
Ca-
pacity 
Secret da-
ta seg-
menting 
Metafunction 
 
  
F1 21 10101101
01001111
00101 
f1,1={10} 
f2,1={10110101001
11100 } 
f3,1={101} 
F2 25 01010101
10011110
01010110
1 
f1,2={0101} 
f2,1={01011001111
0010101} 
f3,1={101} 
F13 18 01010100
01101001
10 
f1,1={0`} 
f2,1={01010001101
00110} 
F14 19 11001111
00110001
XXX 
f2,1={11001111001
10001} 
f3,1={XXX} 
 
Four groups of audio streams (CM, CF, EM, and EF) were used as cover objects, each containing 
three audio pieces of 10, 5 and 3 seconds in length with 333, 166 and 100 frames, respectively. Table 4 
lists the hiding algorithms and hiding vectors used in the experiments. CNV denotes the CNV-based data 
embedding algorithm proposed in [9]; LSB stands for data embedding into the last bits of the parameters 
of encoded audio frames. The cover objects were categorized into three groups, the first used for data 
hiding using the CNV-based algorithm, the second using the LSB algorithm [19] to embed data, and in 
the last group, all the frames of each audio sample were divided into three pieces which were then used 
to hide data using the three hiding vectors listed in Table 4. 
Table 4  Hiding vectors used 
 
 Hid-
ing 
vec-
tors 
Pay-
load 
f1,1 f2,1 f3,1 
F1 3 bits CNV：
3bits 
/ / 
F2 24 
bits 
CNV：
3bits 
LSB：
21bits 
/ 
F3 25 
bits 
/ LSB：
22bits 
3 
 
We used the Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) method, one of the most effective steganal-
ysis methods [24], to perform security analysis, so as to verify the security of the proposed mul-
ti-dimensional steganography. Table 5 lists the detection accuracy of using MFCC to detect the hidden 
message for CNV-based steganography, LSB-substitution based single steganography (LsbOnlyEmbed) 
and multi-dimensional steganography (MultidEmbed), respectively. 
Table 5  Detection accuracy of MFCC steganalysis 
Length of audio pieces CNV LsbOnlyEmbed MultidEmbed 
10s (333 frames) 54.50% 92.20% 81.26% 
5s (166 frames) 51.94% 87.84% 72.15% 
3s (100 frames) 51.62% 81.92% 65.24% 
 
Table 5 shows MFCC was unable to detect the hidden data embedded by using the CNV algorithm, it 
 
  
was very effective in detecting the hidden data embedded with the LsbOnlyEmbed algorithm, but it was 
unlikely to detect the multi-dimensional steganography. For the 3-second samples, the accuracy of de-
tecting single steganography reached 81.92%, whereas that of detecting multi-dimensional steganogra-
phy achieved 65.24% only, which is an extremely poor result for steganalysis. 
The experimental results shows, for the same cover sample, it was unlikely to detect mul-
ti-dimensional steganography compared with single steganography. So the proposed multi-dimensional 
steganography could improve the security of covert communications. Even if part of the secret message 
hidden in one dimension had been detected, it would have been unlikely to extract the whole message as 
other parts of the message were hidden in other dimensions. 
4.2.4 Hiding vector negotiation mechanism 
Synchronization efficiency is defined as the ratio of the number of bits of the secret information m to 
the number of all the bits transmitted over a covert communication section, given by     
     
Cm /=ρ  
where ρ is the synchronization efficiency, m is the number of bits of the secret information, and C is the 
number of bits of the stego streams consisting of the secret information and the controlling bits such as 
synchronization controlling bits. 
In one of the most influential literatures [12], the authors described their VoIP-based covert commu-
nications software, which gained synchronization efficiency of 45% - 91.2%. A hierarchical model for 
covert VoIP communications was suggested in [15], attaining synchronization efficiency of 78% - 92% 
by means of an effective method of optimizing communication efficiency. There is still room for further 
improvement. If the hiding vector synchronization algorithm, suggested by the proposed mul-
ti-dimensional data hiding spatial model, were used for data hiding, synchronization efficiency would 
reach 86% - 97%. The above data analysis indicates covert communications using the proposed hiding 
 
 vector negotiation mechanism can achieve the highest synchronization efficiency. 
Our study also shows, with the hiding vector negotiation mechanism, synchronization efficiency is re-
lated to the updating frequency of hiding vectors of media packets. Fig. 7 shows the relationship be-
tween the synchronization efficiency and the updating frequency of hiding vectors using StegTalk. If 
each RTP packet uses a different hiding vector to hide information, the updating frequency of hiding 
vectors maximizes, and the overhead of hiding synchronization maximizes as well, thus resulting in the 
lowest synchronization efficiency; on the contrary, if ten RTP packets share the same hiding vector, it 
leads to the highest synchronization efficiency. 
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Figure 7  Relationship between synchronization efficiency and the updating frequency of hiding vec-
tors. 
 
The results shown in Fig. 7 are based on the test condition that the percentage of inactive audio frames 
in a VoIP stream was about 70%. In the experiments, apart from 5 bits being used for implementing hid-
ing vector synchronization, 3 bits were introduced to mark the end position of the secret information. If 
the secret information is an instant message, the overhead for marking the end position is higher; how-
ever, it uses fewer bits to mark a secret file. So the synchronization efficiency in transmitting a secret file 
 
  
over covert communications using StegTalk software is much higher than those for transmitting an in-
stant message (see Fig. 7). 
5  Conclusions 
In this study, we have built a multi-dimensional data hiding spatial theoretical model for covert VoIP 
communications, breaking through the bottleneck problem of low data hiding capacity encountered 
while implementing a sole conventional steganographic algorithm. A new concept of data hiding vectors 
has been introduced to improve the synchronization efficiency by reducing overhead. The proposed hid-
ing vector negotiation mechanism for covert VoIP communications has been adopted to withstand 
against detection of steganalysis. Testing on the application of the spatial model to VoIP streams has 
shown that the covert VoIP communications can improve data hiding capacity, imperceptibility, as well 
as synchronization efficiency to a great extent. 
Exploring other methods for constructing data hiding vectors, and improving the imperceptibility of 
the combined hiding vectors through balancing the imperceptibility of hiding vector components for 
each vector are the subjects of future work to break through the Buckets effect limitation.  
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